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THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE: AN ILLUSIVE
ECONOMIC DEFENSE UNDER SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
RICHARD E. LOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
J DICIAL hostility to mergers has become so intense that this common
business practice is on the verge of becoming a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. The Supreme Court has held against the defendant in
every case involving section 7 of the Clayton Act' that has reached it
since the merger law was revised in 1950.2 Yet between 1951 and 1961 the
500 largest industrial companies in the United States made over 3,400
acquisitions, averaging almost seven per firm.3 Almost one-half of the
firms in the $10 to $50 million asset range merge each fifteen years,' and
the finding and negotiating of mergers has become a regular way of life
for many businessmen and lawyers.'
In this head-on clash between business practice and judicial hostility,
any judicially accepted affirmative defense which can uphold a challenged
merger becomes of unique importance, and among the possible affirma-
tive defenses the failing company doctrine enjoys a privileged position.
It was awarded supporting dicta in the landmark case of Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States' as follows: "supporters of the [1950] amendments
indicated that it would not impede, for example, a merger between ...
a corporation which is financially healthy and a failing one which no
longer can be a vital competitive factor in the market."' Also supported by
Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Brown Shoe were the defenses that the merged
firm would be able to afford greater competition to larger industry rivals8
* Lecturer in Economics, The City College of the City University of New York; mem-
ber of the New York Bar.
1. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
2. Simon, A Partial Search for Affirmative Antitrust Answers, in National Indus. Con-
ference Bd., Sth Conference on Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy: Basic Antitrust Ques-
tions in the Middle Sixties 31, 33 (1966).
3. Staff of Select House Comm. on Small Business, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Mergers and
Superconcentration-Acquisitions of 500 Largest Industrial and 50 Largest Merchandising
Firms 22-23 (Comm. Print 1962).
4. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 70 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 2, at 512 (1965).
5. See Weiner, The Perilous Quest for Acquisitions, Dun's Rev. & Modern Indus, July
1965, p. 32.
6. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
7. Id. at 319. (Footnote omitted.) Mr. Chief Justice Warren again alluded to the failing
company defense later in the opinion. Id. at 346.
8. Id. at 319.
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-the "against giants" defense-and that the industry affected is open
to such easy entry by new competitors that any anticompetitive effects
the merger might have would soon be overcomeP--the "ease of entry"
defense. But the failing company doctrine has survived the half decade
since Brown Shoe, retaining greater viability than the other defenses.
The ease of entry defense has not been affirmed by the Supreme Court
since Brown Shoe, and, indeed, has been repudiated as an affirmative de-
fense by the Federal Trade Commission." Its present validity is thus in
doubt, although the FTC decision attacking it was restricted to the
exact facts of the case when affirmed on appeal." The failing company
doctrine and the against giants defense have met no such express opposi-
tion, and, rather, were reaffirmed in 1966 by further Supreme Court
dictum in the otherwise radically antimerger decision in United States v.
Von 's Grocery Co.'2 The majority, however, there defined the against
giants defense in a way which identified it with the failing company doc-
trine,"3 as aptly pointed out in the dissent, 4 thus leaving the failing com-
pany doctrine as the only undisputed section 7 affirmative defense'" other
than the "investment exception" specifically included in the act itself.10
Further reference to this defense in concurring"7 and dissenting 8 Su-
preme Court opinions during the past year seems to leave the failing com-
pany doctrine the unchallenged favorite of majority and minority alike.
Nor can Mr. Chief Justice Warren's statement that this defense rests
on clear congressional intent 0 be disputed. The House Report accompany-
ing the 1950 amendments stated that "it is well settled that the Clayton
Act does not apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases."20 Similarly,
the Senate Report, with a notable difference in terminology, approved
mergers of companies that were in "failing" or "bankrupt" condition.2 1
What "failing" was intended to mean was not indicated.
Six years after the act was passed Representative Emanuel Celler,
9. Id. at 322.
10. Ekco Prods. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 1 16879, at 21900-01 (April 21, 1964).
11. Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 753 (7th Cir. 1965).
12. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
13. Id. at 277 (dictum).
14. Id. at 298 n.28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 277 (dictum).
16. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964); see American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
17. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 280 (1966) (White, J., concurring).
18. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 634 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
19. Text accompanying note 7 supra.
20. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
21. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
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who was in 1950 and 1956, and is now, chairman of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, and whose name graces the first half of the usual name
of the bill-Celler-Kefauver--once again endorsed this view and once
again did not define it. s 2 Further support can be found in the testimony
before the congressional committees which proposed the act.2s Both op-
position and definition, which perhaps would be the result of opposition,
were completely absent.
This introduction attempts no definition of the failing company doc-
trine; as the balance of the article should make clear, no definition is
possible until considerable clarification has taken place. The first, and,
indeed, still the only, Supreme Court case to apply the doctrine-Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. FTC24- - was decided in 1930 in a case involving a
merger caused by the recession following World War I. That famous dis-
senting trio-Justices Brandeis, Holmes and Stone-believed in 1930
that the acquired firm involved was already rescued from the perils of
the 1920 recession by returning prosperity, and that approval of the
merger on failing company grounds was incorrect.' This is one instance
in which the original dissent has not only not become law, but has also
failed to keep its ground even as a minority view.
II. LOGICAL BASES OF THE DOCTRINE
There are two possible ways to state the failing company doctrine.
First, it could be accepted as an exception based on clear congressional
intent, and thus not needing a basis of consistent logic to have effect. Any
company doing poorly enough (how poorly would still have to be deter-
mined) would be free to sell its assets to or to merge completely with any
other concern. The merger would simply be exempted from the law. Sec-
ondly, it might be accepted that a merger with such a company would
be assumed as a matter of law to have neither of the alternate required
effects under section 7-a lessening of competition or a tendency toward
monopoly2 6 Such a presumption would thus be conclusive, and thereby a
rule of substantive law.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in Brown Shoe, in effect combined both bases
by making the congressional intent itself follow from a presumption
that a failing company "no longer can be a vital competitive factor in
22. See Celler, Corporation Mergers and Antitrust Laws, 7 Mercer L. Rev. 267, 271 (1956).
23. Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
dary, 81st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 332-33 (1950) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong, 1st Sess,
ser. 14, pt. 1, at 543 (1949).
24. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
25. Id. at 306 (dissenting opinion).
26. See generally Markham, The New Antitrust Policy and the Individual Business Firm,
30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 607 (1965).
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the market." 7 However, the difference is important. If the defense is
based on congressional intent, its position is considerably stronger than
if it is based merely on a presumed lack of impact on competition."
For, in the latter case, the defense is no stronger than the validity of that
presumed lack of impact, and, in the author's view, the presumption is
seldom, if ever, valid. Yet, customarily, whenever a reason for the
doctrine is demanded, this invalid basis is presented as truth. According to
a legal commentator in the Virginia Law Review: "It can hardly be said
that the acquisition of a company in financial distress could have any
detrimental competitive effect."20 And, according to the district court for
the District of Columbia: "The acquisition of capital stock . . . of a
failing corporation is not within the ban of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
• . . because the acquisition of a failing corporation that is on the verge
of going out of business cannot result in lessening competition or in
creating a monopoly."80 The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, 1
leaving this statement neither endorsed nor refuted by higher authority.
But it has been cited with approval by a former FTC lawyer. 2
It is difficult to refute an argument whose advocates advance no
logical reason in support of it. However, hypothetical examples of failing
company mergers with detrimental competitive effects come readily to
mind. What of a merger of a company with 10 per cent of a market in
which 15 per cent of the business was needed for survival? Would its
sale to a competitor with 40 per cent of *the market have no anticompeti-
tive effects compared with its going out of business and the division of
its former customers among rivals with 20, 30 and 40 per cent of the
market? A Supreme Court which places such heavy emphasis on the
importance of preventing an industry leader from increasing its market
share at all by merger"3 would hardly consider the failing firm's merger
with the industry leader as lacking effect on competition. The same would
be true of a failing company which owned some desirable asset, such as a
27. 370 U.S. at 319. (Footnote omitted.)
28. For a discussion of tests of probable competitive impact see Edwards, Tests of Proba-
ble Effect Under the Clayton Act, 9 Antitrust Bull. 369 (1964).
29. von Kalinowski, Section 7 and Competitive Effects, 48 Va. L. Rev. 827, 841 (1962).
30. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C.
1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
31. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 467 (1960),
reversing 167 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1958), and affirming 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), 168
F. Supp. 880 (D.).C. 1959).
32. Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 Geo. LJ.
84, 92 (1960).
33. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (acquired firm
having less than 27 of the market).
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patent or scarce personnel, without means of raising sufficient capital to
develop it.3
4
The unthinking acceptance of this doctrine is the more remarkable
in that merging with failing companies was a traditional path toward
monopolization in the early days of antitrust, at least according to some
authorities. As FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon has put the matter, the
famous 1911 case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States"' showed "a
distinct causal relationship between mergers, price discrimination, and
monopolization .... [The] receiver of discriminatory concessions builds
a treasury at the expense of weak suppliers ... used ... to destroy its
own weaker rivals and... 'merge' them out of existence." ' The above
examples and quotation illustrate the importance of the question of whiy
a company is failing-a question which, to the best of the author's
knowledge, has never been seriously considered by a court. The related
question of a family firm-and the results of human mortality-is con-
sidered further below.
It must be presumed that advocates of this doctrine believe the correct
comparison to be between the competitiveness of the industry upon
the bankruptcy of the failing company and its competitiveness after the
merger. There may be an unspoken assumption that failure does not occur
in business until the last customer is lost; such an assumption might
justify the doctrine, but its absurdity is clear.
If no merger is allowed, the alternatives are liquidation or new man-
agement, with or without the sale of the company to new ownership. The
former implies a sale of assets, presumably to more than one purchaser.
The buyers could be competitors or, for many assets, concerns from other
industries. A sale of all the assets to one buyer from the same industry
would resurrect the section 7 question, but the problem of to whom to sell
is common in section 7 divestiture orders3 7 and seems to be considered
soluble.
New management, with or without new ownership would solve the
problem where inefficient management is the cause of failure;3" a con-
glomerate sale would solve the problem where a higher cost of capital
for a small competitor was the cause of failure, if the conglomerate
34. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), in which a merger
with a possibly failing company having substantial access to a scarce raw material was held
to be violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
35. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
36. Dixon, Price Discrimination and the Sherman Act, 27 ABA Section of Antitrust Law
13, 16-17 (1965).
37. Cf. Simon, supra note 2, at 40.
38. For an account of varying results in the same industry under different managements
see Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 392 (1966).
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purchaser were large enough. Both these conditions seem to have been
present in the conglomerate merger in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,"
which is one reason why its narrow reciprocity holding was unfortunate
for the development of law in this area.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the failing company doctrine
has no logical basis as it is usually stated. When more clearly defined,
however, it may be rational, especially in conjunction with other less
judicially popular affirmative defenses. Otherwise it would remain only
on the basis of congressional intent, and, as a practical matter, the
interpretation and application of any doctrine becomes difficult indeed in
the absence of a rational basis for it. It is impossible to determine whether
any particular factor fits into the doctrine's purpose if that purpose is not
known.
III. RELATION TO OTHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The failing company doctrine is most closely related to the against
giants defense. The Justice Department approved the Kaiser-Willys,
Nash-Hudson, and Studebaker-Packard mergers on what can be called
combined failing company and "little fellow" grounds.4" It would seem
that the latter ground was far more relevant since the failing company
doctrine applies to the acquisition of such a firm by a prosperous one.
If relevant at all to the automobile industry, it perhaps would have
justified the acquisition of any of the six automobile companies concerned
by General Motors. But the coupling of these two defenses well illustrates
the use of the failing company doctrine to justify a merger justifiable, if
at all, under some less popular doctrine.41
In addition to the distinction between these defenses based upon
whether one or both firms is failing, the failing company doctrine differs
from the against giants defense in the degree of financial difficulty nec-
essary for a firm to qualify. While the nature of failure under that doctrine
is unclear, almost any definition would have to be stricter than under the
against giants defense.
39. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
40. Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 Va.
L. Rev. 489, 496 (1957).
41. A more relevant example can be found in the approval by the Justice Department
of the International Press-United Press merger, conveyed in a letter from the then Assistant
Attorney General Victor Hansen to the president of United Press. Note, Horizontal Mergers
and the "Failing Firm" Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 Va. L.
Rev. 421, 424-25 & n.31 (1959). In granting such approval, the Antitrust Division was
implementing a suggestion made during the hearings on the bill by Senator Herbert O'Connor,
Democrat of Maryland, who was a member of the subcommittee. Hearings on H.R. 2734




The failing company doctrine is also related to the natural monopoly
and "efficiency" affirmative defenses and shares with all a logical relation-
ship to ease of entry. In Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New
England Inc.,' which is the only case based directly on the argument of
natural monopoly, the argument is parallel to a failing company one. 3
It would seem that the only use for a natural monopoly defense, instead
of a failing company one, would be to permit the merger at an earlier stage
of company decline.
In regard to efficiency, it could be argued that efficiency would be well
served by permitting the acquisition of a less efficient firm by a more
efficient one and that failure is good evidence of inefficiency. This argu-
ment, if carried to its logical extreme, would justify the acquisition of any
firm with smaller profits by a competitor with larger ones." At the
other extreme it would justify a failing company merger where the
impossibility of sale left the wasting of assets as the only alternative.
This relationship is well illustrated in a recent case, United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co.45 The government complaint included what seems to
be an efficiency charge by the Justice Department against the merger:
"(d) The acquisition alleged herein may enhance Pabst's competitive
advantage in the production and sale of beer to the detriment of actual
and potential competition." '46 Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
added the details:
[In 1959 [the year after the merger] the Blatz brewery in Wisconsin was dosed
down, and Blatz beer was brewed in the four Pabst breweries, because 'decentraliza-
tion' was considered more efficient. To the extent that it is true that local breweries
have an advantage in terms of efficiency and thus cost, a significant barrier exists to
brewers who wish to sell in Wisconsin but brew their beer in other areas of the
country.47
But Pabst viewed the merger as an alternative to incipient failure:
"[T]he purpose [of the merger] . . . was to avoid the consequences of
Pabst's declining sales and increasing losses . . . ."' This claim has not
yet received judicial consideration since Pabst was dismissed by the
district court at the end of the plaintiff's case4" and remanded for a new
trial by the Supreme Court last June.50
42. 284 F.2d 582 (lst Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
43. Id. at 589-90.
44. Since this applies only to intra-industry comparisons, it would lead to easier standards
for horizontal than for vertical mergers-the reverse of the usual position.
45. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
46. Id. at 548 n.2.
47. Id. at 559.
48. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
49. Id. at 495.
50. 384 U.S. at 553.
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The against giants, natural monopoly, and efficiency defenses thus can
all be viewed as incipient failing company cases, becoming relevant when
a firm is doing poorly but not yet poorly enough to warrant the latter
defense. It may be that courts will approve mergers officially on failing
company grounds which more correctly should be classified under another,
but less accepted judicially, defense. This question is explored further
below in relation to how serious a company's financial position must be
for it to be considered failing.
All these defenses are also related to ease of entry in that judicial
errors of judgment, and accessions of market power and share through
approved mergers, are only temporary where ease of entry exists. This
is even true for the natural monopoly or duopoly argument, as shown
in the Consolidated Foods case.51 Not only errors in judgment, but future
changes in market share and possible company size as well, can be rec-
tified naturally in such industries.
IV. LimITATIONS
A few years ago there were complaints that no recent cases had arisen
to show the degree to which our courts, and especially the Supreme Court,
still held to the failing company doctrine. 2 While Brown Shoe presumably
settled that question, the same lack of relevant cases has prevented the
doctrine from being spelled out in much judicial detail.
The most important qualification of the doctrine is whether the exis-
tence of other bidders is relevant to the legality of the challenged merger.
In the fact pattern of the original International Shoe case, decided under
the old section 7 and first recognizing a failing company exception,"
there were no other offers.54 Is this a necessary condition of the doctrine?
Mr. Chief Justice Warren did not answer this question in Brown Shoe.
According to former Antitrust Division chief Robert Bicks, he was
"very careful" not to be more specific in some aspects of his failing
company doctrine dicta."5 It is encouraging to know that sometimes lack
of clarity is purposeful. However, Mr. Bicks may have been overly
critical in this regard. The failing company doctrine was not relevant
to Brown Shoe, and the case was not an appropriate vehicle for extensive
51. The relevant markets were characterized by ease of entry and rapid growth, resulting
in several new entrants threatening what apparently had been a natural duopoly. See 380
U.S. at 605 (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. Vukasin, The Anti-Merger Law of the United States: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow,
3 Antitrust Bull. 455, 465 (1958).
53. See Connor, supra note 32, at 85.
54. This distinction has been specifically made by the FTC. Brief for Appellee, p. 14,
Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
55. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Transcript of Panel Discussion on Implications of
Brown Shoe for Merger Law and Enforcement 28 (1962).
[Vol. 35
FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE
dicta on the subject. The Supreme Court had endorsed this qualification
in the same term of Court as Brown Shoe. It did so in a unanimous per
curiam reversal and remand of a district court summary judgment in
United States v. Diebold, Inc."s
In 1961 the district court for the Southern District of Ohio granted
summary judgment for the defendant because, as a matter of law, the
fact that the acquired company had been "hopelessly insolvent and
faced with imminent receivorship" for nine months meant that the
justice Department had no case.5" Despite the fact that one article states
that the Supreme Court deliberately refused to review in order not to
clarify the doctrine,5s it did reverse and did clarify the main question in
doubt as follows:
In determining that the acquisition of the assets of Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Com-
pany was not a violation of § 7, the District Court acted upon its findings that "HMM
was hopelessly insolvent and faced with imminent receivorship" and that "Diebold
was the only bona fide prospective purchaser for HHM's business." The latter finding
represents at least in part the resolution of a head-on factual controversy as revealed
by the materials before the District Court of whether other offers .. .were actually
made.59
This Supreme Court position would seem to settle the matter as to the
need to show that there were no other bona fide purchasers, although it
settles nothing as to what basis, if any, should be used in selecting among
possible purchasers. The Diebold case itself did not reach a new trial
and presumably was settled out of court.
Since the no other purchasers requirement limits the application of the
doctrine, it should logically be upheld as necessary by plaintiffs. Thus, it
is not surprising that the claim of other "interested" purchasers was
recently raised by the FTC in FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,G0 now remanded
for trial or settlement.61
If Mr. Bicks is correct in his statement that the Chief Justice in Brown
Shoe was "very careful to leave out the 'no other prospective purchasers
available' requirement, both times he stated [the doctrine] . . . .""_ then
even the slight clarity of Diebold no longer applies. If the question of other
bidders has become, or will become, legally irrelevant, then the doctrine
is even more economically meaningless.
The absence of no other bidders might be due to a duopoly market
structure before the merger, but this could not be common in unregulated
56. 369 US. 654 (1962).
57. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902, 906 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
58. von Kalinowski, supra note 29, at 843.
59. 369 U.S. at 655.
60. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
61. Id. at 612.
62. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 55.
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industries. It might also be due to the fact that only one other firm
has sufficient capital or credit, an unlikely situation as the law is develop-
ing.0 3 However, where this situation does exist, it would presumably
mean acquisition by the industry leader, and thus probably more anti-
competitive effects than would be caused by a sale to any other competitor.
No other possible purchasers might result from a situation where
buying the company or its assets is a close question as to desirability or
where the company's particular assets mean more to one competitor than
to another. In the first case, the merger probably would not have much
effect on competition; in the second, it could have a great deal.
Although the author assumes that the existence of other bidders is
relevant to whether the failing company was sold to the correct purchaser,
from the view of minimizing anticompetitive effects, the courts sometimes
take it as an indication that a company was prosperous enough to
continue on its own.04 The logic of this is hard to see, and the Supreme
Court has not yet indicated its view of the subject.
A note in the Yale Law Journal has suggested that public bidding
should be required and that the highest bidder might be ruled out and a
lower bidder substituted if necessary to minimize anticompetitive ef-
fects. 5 Perhaps it would be better to forbid bidding by firms that would
not be permitted to buy. That could have unfortunate effects-from the
stockholder viewpoint-on the bidding, another example of how the
small capital owner can be made to pay for the antitrust laws.00 Should
advanced approval for mergers ever be required by law,"7 this matter
could be worked out somewhat more logically.
Several other possible limitations of, or qualifications for, the doctrine
also await judicial clarification. In the Pabst case, for example, the district
court stated that "the plaintiff moved to strike this 'failing enterprise' de-
fense, contending that it was available only when the acquired, not the ac-
quiring entity was failing. This motion was denied."0 8 The Supreme Court,
in remanding, ignored this problem. There seems to be no particular logic
to the justice Department position here. The fact that the defense is
being applied to the acquiring company might be used to question its
63. Section 7 cases have recently involved smaller and smaller companies. E.g., FTC
v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 US. 592 (1965). FTC cases may also involve smaller
companies than those brought by the Justice Department.
64. Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961).
65. Notes and Comments, "Substantially To Lessen Competition . . .": Current Problems
of Horizontal Mergers, 68 Yale L.J. 1627, 1668 (1959).
66. Kaysen, The Present War on Bigness: I, in National Indus. Conference Bd., 4th
Conference on Antitrust in an Expanding Economy: The Impact of Antitrust on Economic
Growth 31, 38 (1965).
67. Celler, supra note 22, at 277.
68. 233 F. Supp. at 478 n.2.
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failing status, but if that status is authentic the government claim is
simply legal gymnastics.
Another possible qualification is as to whether prospective failure
qualifies a company. If this future misfortune is simply the result of
accumulating losses, then the question becomes the same as the prob-
lem of how badly a company must be doing, as discussed below. But
presumably, the prospective failure could be expected on the ground
of one specific future event. This was argued by the defendant in the
Dean Foods case, Dean alleging that it was about to lose its biggest
customer with the result that the merged concern would be smaller than
the pre-merger company.6"
Ordinarily such a claim could be verified or refuted on the basis of
post-merger evidence, the validity of which was recently upheld by the
Supreme Court.70 This did not apply to Dean Foods, which came before
the Supreme Court on a question of a preliminary injunction."' But if
the case comes to trial and the expected loss proves to have materialized,
the validity of such an argument may then be determined. The case may
also resolve the question of failure by the acquiring company, since Dean
was the acquiring company in that merger.
Prospective failure might well have a broader context and more impor-
tance than at first appears. Companies facing the loss of defense
contracts, the expiration of a patent, or similar business disasters might
well seek a solution through merger and assert a Dean defense.
Another possible limitation is whether there exists a failing product
aspect of the failing company doctrine. In fact, this particular aspect can
claim a merger victory for the defendant in United States v. Lever
Bros.12 Monsanto had sold a product, the detergent All, to Lever
Brothers, or, to be technically correct, had sold the trademark. 3 It had
lost $416,000 on the product in 1955. According to Judge Dawson, "it
was the desire of Monsanto to get out of a business in which it could
only lose money unless it invested continually larger amounts for adver-
tising and promotion to compete with Procter & Gamble and Colgate."'74
The fact pattern of the case is somewhat complex. It might be thought
that Lever Brothers itself might have qualified as a failing company. Its
profits in the soap business had declined from $3 million in 1953 to
$431,000 in 1956 to $142,000 in 1960, not offsetting its losses in deter-
gents, All excepted.75 However, Judge Dawson, perhaps because he
69. 384 US. at 634 (dissenting opinion).
70. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
71. 384 U.S. at 599.
72. 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
73. Id. at 895.
74. Id. at 896.
75. Id. at 896-97.
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assumed the question related to the status of the acquired product's
company, dealt with it as a question of a "failing brand.""0
Monsanto, according to Judge Dawson, had discussed the sale of All
with three prospective purchasers before approaching Lever Brothers:
General Foods broke off negotiations itself; Purex was rejected because
it lacked sufficient capital to effectively promote All; and Armour refused
to meet Monsanto's prices for future purchases of raw materials for
making the product." Certainly, if there were a no other prospective
purchaser qualification of the doctrine based on a sale resulting in the
minimization of anticompetitive effects, it is difficult to see that this
merger would qualify. However, this was not discussed by the court.
Post-merger evidence was used to show lack of anticompetitive effects,7"
although Judge Dawson's description of a 9.7% to 11.6% rise in the
market share of independents as "almost 20 per cent"7" seems somewhat
questionable. The case depends to some degree on line of commerce
juggling between all detergents and types of detergents" and raises
many more questions than it answers-e.g., is the fact, as mentioned by
Judge Dawson, that Lever Brothers could advertise All more cheaply
than could Monsanto (as a result of its other advertised brands), an
efficiency argument for a merger or just an explanation of why All had
failed commercially under Monsanto's ownership?"'
The Lever case has a particular distinction in that it upheld a merger.
The grounds on which it did are not clear, but seem to be based on
a very sweeping and unqualified failing company doctrine. Judge Dawson
quotes at length dicta in the Supreme Court on mergers being "'viewed,
in the context of its particular industry.' ,82 He quotes also, and to the
same effect, from another district court opinion,8 3 his decision coming a
year before that case was reversed by the Supreme Court.
Should the judicial atmosphere toviard mergers become less harsh,
and mergers once again defended with some hope of victory, the Lever
Bros. case could well become an important precedent, with its dicta
76. Id. at 899.
77. Id. at 896.
78. Id. at 900-01. The use of post-merger evidence has been approved by the Supreme
Court. Note 70 supra and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 900.
80. Id. at 897-98.
81. The court stated that "Monsanto, with only one consumer brand, could not afford
the heavy costs of network television sponsorship. Lever Brothers ...has been ...divid-
ing such sponsorship among several of its brands." Id. at 899.
82. Id. at 898, quoting from Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 670 U.S. 294, 321-22
(1962).
83. Id. at 901, quoting from United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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widely quoted and its basis as obscure as ever. Until then it seems to be
rather an oddity, applicable as a precedent probably only in situations
where the sale of part of a company raises a failing company question.
V. TESTS OF A FAILING STATUS
The fact that the failing company doctrine is so widely and so highly
endorsed has prevented consideration of which standards to apply from
being completely a defendants' problem. The Federal Trade Commission
did argue once that Hamilton Watch Co. v. Bennis Watch Co." had
destroyed this defense, 5 but it has not taken that position recently. In
A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC,86 it even endorsed it,8 7 perhaps because
the doctrine was irrelevant in that litigation. In Crown Zellerbach Corp.
v. FTC,8" it struck a happy compromise. As the defendant's brief well
put it, the FTC found against Crown Zellerbach: "without reversing the
hearing examiner [on the failing condition of the acquired company] or
making an additional finding.")89
The Justice Department, in addition to granting advanced approval
to some mergers on at least partially failing company grounds,"0 has also
conceded the validity of the defense in a case in which it did not apply. 1
It considers the financial condition of a merging firm as one factor as to
whether or not it should file a complaint-a merger involving a firm not
doing badly enough to come within the narrow Justice Department
definition of failing92 may still not be challenged if it has a serious finan-
cial problem. 3
Six different standards as to what constitutes a failing company are
suggested in the cases, other than the last extremity of bankruptcy or
insolvency. To insist on the last extremity seems rather severe on the
stockholders and creditors and may be contrary to the purpose of the
exception, should it be based on the non-economic consideration of
protecting stockholder or creditor interests.
The most popular test seems to be the existence or absence of a profit.
The existence of profits may, indeed, be enough to rule out the failing
84. 206 F2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
85. Brief for Appellee, p. 13, Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F2d 279 (3d Cir.
1961).
86. 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
87. Record, p. 253 (Initial Decision).
88. 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
89. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 32-33, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F2d 8 (9th
Cir. 1959).
90. Jacobs, Merger Clearance Problems, 2 Antitrust Bull. 187 (1956).
91. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
92. Vukasin, supra note 52, at 463.
93. Jacobs, supra note 90, at 193-94.
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company doctrine in law. In Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 4 both the
FTC95 and the Third Circuit 6 took this position, the profits not being
specified but described by the FTC as "nice. 917 In fact, they seem to
have been reasonable and here this standard does work. But it works
primarily because there was no evidence at all that the acquired company
was a "failing" one under any standard. It was a matter' of voluntary
liquidation."
The Crown Zellerback case and United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co.99 present closer questions. In Crown Zellerbach, for example,
it was true both that St. Helens, the acquired company, made a profit of
approximately $1,250,000 in 1952, and that it was running at a loss
during the last quarter of 1952.10 However, in the author's judgment this
approach was really irrelevant since by better standards, discussed
below, St. Helens was a failing company.10'
In El Paso, Pacific Northwest had made a profit, but it was much too
small a profit to stay in business. In 1959, for example, it made a profit
of approximately $3,600,000, while its projected profit under its Federal
Power Commission certification, presumably an equitable one, was much
greater.' 02 Once again an existence of profit test seems irrelevant. A rate
of profit test might work, but would apparently require a much higher
level of judicial sophistication than now exists. At least it is not argued
in the cases.
Both Crown Zellerbach and El Paso also raise an access to capital
test for failing company status. According to Crown Zellerbach, St. Helens
had been compelled to cancel its modernization program10 3 through
inability to raise the necessary funds-" 'the available capital St. Helens
needed was not available.' 1104 But again Crown Zellerbach was not
94. 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
95. Brief for Respondent, pp. 13-15, Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d
Cir. 1961).
96. 291 F.2d at 280-81.
97. Brief for Respondent, p. 13, Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.
1961).
98. The court found that "Sandusky was a profitable enterprise and it was offered for
sale as a going concern .... [Pireceding the decision to liquidate, the business earned sub-
stantial profits." 291 F.2d at 280.
99. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
100. Brief for Petitioner, p. 4, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir.
1961).
101. See text accompanying notes 115-29 infra.
102. Record, vol. 68, pp. 53-54, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964).
103. Brief for Petitioner, p. 69, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1961).
104. Id. at 72.
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convincing. The myopic Ninth Circuit stated in Crown Zellcrbach that
"'there are no facts in this record to clearly indicate that St. Helens
would have been unable to complete its modernization program."' ,0
However, the court did not deny that this approach might have been valid
if it had found such evidence.
In the El Paso case, the question was whether Pacific Northwest would
have had the financial strength to expand into the Southern California
market on its own. No, said El Paso."'8 Yes, said the Justice Department,
whose answer was from two viewpoints. First, it denied that any particular
financial strength was even necessary for such expansion-Pacific had
excess pipeline capacity (but where?) already."' 7 Secondly, it argued that
raising funds was no problem anyway.108 According to Mr. Justice Doug-
las, speaking for the Supreme Court, "Pacific Northwest was no feeble,
failing company .... It had raised $250 million for its pipeline .... ,,101
Pacific Northwest's success in raising its original capital-that very
capital whose unsatisfactory return was a matter of unquestioned record-
was thus considered evidence by the highest court of that firm's capacity
to raise new capital. What can be said of such an opinion? According to
Mr. Justice Harlan's separate opinion, it was against all tradition and
law.1"0 It seems equally against all economics and common sense.
Both cases appear, however, to uphold the test of access to capital
needed for expansion; at least neither denies the argument, both only
deny the facts. Therefore, they seem to be valid precedents for an access
to capital or ability to expand approach to the failing company doctrine.
Both the Justice Department in El Paso"' and the FTC in Crown
Zellerbac 1 2 objected to the courts' even investigating the matter. After
all, said the Justice Department in El Paso, such an inquiry is appropriate
only with a "failing company." It has no place in an affair concerning
"this young and vigorously-competing company."11 Here, the Justice
Department seems to be trying to have its cake and eat it too, since the
very fact that suit had been brought showed that Pacific Northwest did
not qualify under its own standard as a failing company. Fundamentally,
105. 296 F.2d at 832, quoting from 54 F.T.C. 769, 806 (1957).
106. Record, vol. 68, p. 65, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964).
107. Brief for Appellant, pp. 33-34.
108. Record, p. 25.
109. 376 US. at 661. (Footnote omitted.)
110. See 376 U.S. at 664.
111. Record, p. 23-24.
112. Brief for Respondent, p. 17, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1961).




however, the Justice Department is probably correct here; a failing
company would have to be very liberally defined to include a concern like
Pacific Northwest, which showed every prospect of continued, although
small, profits. 4 In fact, the case seems to be an example of an efficiency
argument being given a failing company cover, as discussed above.
The FTC, in objecting to court inquiry into St. Helens as a possible
failing company, was on much weaker ground. Although St. Helens was
not yet in bankruptcy or insolvent, it had avoided insolvency only by
cancelling orders upon finding itself unable to pay for them."' It would
be difficult to find any failing company definition, short of bankruptcy,
which would not include a company whose solvency was so tenuous.
There is also a suggestion in the cases of an "existence" or "going
concern" test. In Erie, the FTC argued that the fact, claimed to be such
by the FTC, that the acquired company would have stayed in business
by itself (possibly under different management) if the merger had not
occurred, and would resume business if it were disallowed, eliminated
the failing company approach."' In this fact pattern, it appears to have
been true that the acquired company had the ability to continue if it had
the will to do so. According to the Third Circuit, "had Erie not bid, the
prospect was not the elimination of a competing enterprise but merely
its continuation under some new proprietorship."'1 That is one extreme.
The other is St. Helens. As Crown Zellerbach expressed it, "the Com-
mission . . . equated 'competition' with mere existence [and] concluded
that its absence would substantially lessen 'competition.' "'18
It would seem equitable to state that although the failing company
doctrine clearly cannot be applied to a concern with fair prospects of
competitive profits, only the strictest "bankruptcy" or "insolvency" test
would include a "going concern" concept. To make the doctrine inap-
plicable to any company that was doing business at the moment of the
merger or asset sale would not only go much further than any case has
so far, but also would encourage waste and the defrauding of creditors
by forcing a company to close down before it could merge. Most com-
panies presumably can be sold for a greater sum when in operation than
in liquidation.
Rising or falling sales have also been advanced as a test, or at least
114. These were derived from a continuing factor-special access to Canadian reserves.
Id. at 6.
115. Brief for Respondent, p. 69, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1961).
116. Brief for Respondent, p. 15, Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.
1961).
117. 291 F.2d at 280.




as an indication of a company's position. Crown Zellerbach's attempt to
use that standard availed it no more than did its other suggested tests.
According to Crown Zellerbach's figures, St. Helens' sales fell from 65,000
tons in 1951 to 52,500 tons in 1952.119 However, this did not impress the
FTC, which, with an utter disregard of inflation, the Korean War, and
common sense, argued on its side that St. Helens' sales had risen from
$5,400,000 in 1943 to $9,200,000 in 1952.12' The details of the individual
years were apparently not within the world view, but Crown Zellerbach's
figures would have been more convincing here if they had covered more
than two years. Some fluctuations in sales presumably can result from
normal competitive factors. 1
In that golden year of 1952, according to the FTC, St. Helens, far
from failing, had assets of $15,200,000 and equity of $9,400,000.' - It is
the view of one legal commentator that the law today is that the failing
company doctrine will not be applied where there is any substantial
equity. 23 There is no particular evidence that this is the law, although
it would explain the Crown Zellerbach decision. To make the existence
of substantial equity the test would be to make the doctrine's purpose the
protection of creditors and bondholders, leaving stockholders to their
fate. Such a distinction is explicitly drawn in no case and would result
in forcing a company to waste its assets before selling out. The doctrine
is illogical enough without this added handicap.
It would appear, according to the FTC, that the fact that a company
pays dividends removes it from the failing company category. According
to the FTC in Crown Zellerbach, St. Helens had paid dividends every
year since 1929, except in 1932.124 These views were all endorsed by the
Ninth Circuit.
125
It would be hard to deny that any firm, except in a declining industry,
which loses sales over an extended period of time is in a bad way. The
only real question in regard to St. Helens was whether such declining
sales were likely to continue. This apparently depended upon the modern-
ization program, which in turn depended upon the availability of new
capital. 12 16 It is difficult to conceive of any firm with declining sales over
119. Id. at 4.
120. Brief for Respondent, p. 7. This language was quoted with approval by the court
in the Crown Zellerbach case. 296 F.2d at 831-32.
121. 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 318-39.
122. Brief for Respondent, p. 8, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F2d 800 (9th Cir.
1961).
123. Wiley, The "Failing Company": A Real Defense in Horizontal Merger Cases, 41
B.U.L. Rev. 495, 503 (1961).
124. Brief for Respondent, p. 8.
125. 296 F.2d at 831-32.
126. Brief for Petitioner, p. 72.
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a period of time-except when it is a reflection of an industry decline-
which would not raise the question of why the decline was taking place
and whether a cure was possible, rather than simply accepting it as an
inevitable failure. Here again, the complete ignoring by the courts of
the question of why a firm is failing tends to make this defense difficult
to define logically.
The payment of dividends, except as an aspect of a profits test, does
not seem a valid standard, unless the argument is followed that the firm
need not be failing if properly run and the dividends taken as evidence
of bad management. But again the government has not pursued this pos-
sible development of the doctrine.
Crown Zellerbach also offered another test in its brief before the Ninth
Circuit, a reverse of the other possible purchasers qualification. Accord-
ing to Crown Zellerbach, St. Helens' management had offered to sell
the firm to two other companies, both of which had investigated and
refused-whether absolutely or because of the price demanded does not
appear. 12 7 However, the argument did not help Crown Zellerbach, since
the circuit court ignored this, as well as other convincing arguments, in
finding for the FTC.'
28
Other tests which have been suggested, although not much explored
in the cases, are the rate of operations compared to capacity, the condi-
tion of the plant (rather similar to access to capital since obsolescence
need not otherwise be permanent), poor management caliber, and unit
operational costs compared to the competition. 29
VI. THE ONE-MAN Fui
A problem closely related to the failing company doctrine is that of
the family firm, or, put somewhat differently, of one-man firms which
pass to non-business or incapable heirs. This problem may be solved in
practice by the fact that when professional management fails to develop
the concern is usually too small to come within the compass of the federal
antitrust laws. However, there is a grey area consisting of companies not
large enough to attract capable outsiders and not small enough to hide
behind the protection of limited size. This problem was raised at the
hearings on the Celler-Kefauver Bill, but was brushed aside as being
ruled out by smallness.'
However, like many other problems brushed aside during the passage
127. Id. at 4.
128. 296 F.2d at 832.
129. Wiley, supra note 123, at 507-08.
130. Hearings on H.R. 2734 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 99-105 (1950).
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of the Celler-Kefauver Bill,131 this one is still with us. Indeed, it enjoys
a current illustration in the Von's Grocery case.
According to Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, "Mr. Hayden,
the president and principal stockholder of Shopping Bag [the acquired
company], was advanced in years and was concerned over the absence
of a strong management staff that could take over his responsibilities."' 2
It should be noted that in this particular application of the failing com-
pany doctrine, the firm need not be in bad financial straits at all; it need
only have no system of management recruitment. If such a defense were
to be allowed, it would presumably be in the form of certain manage-
ment characteristics being taken as evidence of future failure. Certain
industries, including retailing, probably are more liable to such factors,
and the fact of a firm's still being headed by its founder would be relevant
evidence.
In the Von's Grocery case, this future failure had some past and present
evidence. Again, according to Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent:
Von's was a considerably more successful competitor than Shopping Bag. Shopping
Bag's net income as a percentage of total sales declined from 1.6% in 1957 to 0.9%
in 1959, and its net profit as a percentage of total assets declined from 6.6% to 3.2%.
During the same period, the net income of Von's increased from 2.1% to 2.3%, and
its net profits declined from 12.7% to 10.8%.133
It is a change indeed to pass from a concern like Olin Mathieson, which
considered, in another section 7 case, 4 a projected after-tax profit of
10 per cent too small an inducement to undertake a new investment,tm
to Shopping Bag, whose octogenarian president saw his profits decline
from 6.6 to 3.2 per cent." 6 A fact pattern similar to the Von's Grocery
case, considered in a less antimerger atmosphere, could well give birth to
some useful standards in this area.
It is illustrative of the way in which economic problems are influenced
by national mores that a prominent French economist believes that the
strength of the family firm is a barrier against the merger movement in
his country." 7 The son and grandson, presumably, would never so dilute
131. Two related questions-the failing company doctrine and bank coverage by the
act-were ignored and are still in relative confusion. The Supreme Court has stated that
"thus, arguably, the so-called failing-company defense ...might have somewhat larger
contours as applied to bank mergers.. . ." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 372 nA6 (1963). (Citation omitted.)
132. 384 U.S. at 298 n.29.
133. Id. at 298 n.30.
134. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
135. Record, vol. 116, p. 135.
136. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
137. Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation 502 (Chamberlin ed. 1953).
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the family honor as to sell out. However, French peasant blood is not
predominant in this country and a special exception here, based on the
difficulty or impossibility of recruiting new executives, might be indicated
-at least if it can be shown that the firm was offered for sale as a
separate concern without an acceptable offer. Nor should it be thought
that such an exception would be based on sentiment or political considera-
tions. Lucrative sales under such conditions would presumably encourage
entry and aid in maintaining the independent entrepreneur as a factor
in the economy.138
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It has been suggested-by both the friends13 and the enemies1 41 of a
rational interpretation of section 7-that the failing company doctrine
should give way to the consideration of a firm's financial condition as one
of several relevant factors bearing on the legality of a merger rather than
as a limited, separate defense. In an atmosphere favorable to the develop-
ment of a rational law of mergers the author would strongly favor such
a transition.
At present, the failing company doctrine serves primarily as a shield
behind which advocates of specific mergers can advance arguments more
correctly belonging to against giants, efficiency, natural monopoly, or,
if it be considered separately, one-generation company defenses. This
confusion of thought may help specific mergers win approval. But it
greatly harms constructive thought in this field. It would seem to the
author that judicial repudiation of the failing company doctrine may
be a necessary prerequisite to the recognition of the other affirmative
defenses.
If the basis of the failing company doctrine is not, in fact, a rational
belief in an absence of effect on competition, but simply original con-
gressional intent, then it would be helpful to limit such exceptions to
cases of real financial extremity. Then, wherever the line may be drawn,
it would be possible to resume arguments based on more rational defenses
for those mergers concerning companies on the brighter side of whatever
judicial definition of "failing" finally emerges.
138. Kaysen, The Present War on Bigness: I, in National Indus. Conference Bd., 4th
Conference on Antitrust in an Expanding Economy: The Impact of Antitrust on Economic
Growth 31, 38 (1965).
139. Levi, The du Pont Case and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 3 Antitrust Bull. 3, 11
(1958).
140. Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 Geo. L.J.
84, 99 (1960).
